During the 1970s many developing countries experienced commodity "booms," sharp but temporary increases in the prices of their primary exports. Statistical work on the simulation of commodity markets (Gilbert 1985) implies that the price fluctuations which are common in such markets are generally not symmetrical about the mean but take the form of sporadic peaks followed by long, shallow troughs. In studying the economic consequences of fluctuations in commodity prices, we focus upon these boom phases.
During the 1970s many developing countries experienced commodity "booms," sharp but temporary increases in the prices of their primary exports. Statistical work on the simulation of commodity markets (Gilbert 1985) implies that the price fluctuations which are common in such markets are generally not symmetrical about the mean but take the form of sporadic peaks followed by long, shallow troughs. In studying the economic consequences of fluctuations in commodity prices, we focus upon these boom phases.
T;he effect of the coffee boom of 1976-79 upon growth and income distribution in Kenya is analyzed in this article. Virtually no tax was imposed on coffee so that private agents received the entire windfall which, because it resulted from a frost in Brazil, was understood to be temporary.' In allocating this temporary windfall, however, private agents faced government-imposed constraints in the form of foreign exchange controls, import controls, interest rate ceilings, and biased investment allocation. We address below three questions related to these constrained choices. First, a priori, how would such controls alter allocative decisi6ns? Second,-did the actual allocation of the Kenyan windfall conform to these theoretical expectations? Third, what were the consequences of this allocation for growth and the distribution of income between rural and urban households?
Three distinct literatures have addressed the economics of commodity price fluctuations. One investigates whether there is a relationship between "instability" and growth primarily using multicountry cross-section data. The concern with the macroeconomic effects of instability on commodity markets has a long history, including Keynes's wartime plea for buffer stoclcs. A more recent and rigorous literature (Newbery and Stiglitz 1981) explores the theory of the microeconomic consequences of price fluctuations. Finally, the chronic macroeconomic problems currently besetting many developing countries have prompted a literature on "stabilization" and "structural adjustment" which is largely a policy-driven analysis of the responses to balance of payments constraints induced by terms of trade deterioration (Ahamed 1986 ). This literature does not provide detailed comparative case studies combining micro-and macroeconomic analyses of price fluctuations.
This article reports on a component of our research on the coffee boom of 1976-79 in Kenya and Tanzania. The scope of the project encompasses private sector responses to windfall income and relative price changes, public sector revenue and expenditure behavior, and the consequences of these changes for distribution and growth. Within the private sector, the analysis of peasant behavior is derived from panel data generated by purpose-designed surveys in both countries. That analysis will be reported subsequently, this article being confined to macro and general equilibrium aspects of the boom. A second important component of the project which is not reported here is the behavior of the public sector. The loss of control over government expenditure induced by a temporary increase in revenue had such powerful macro repercussions that it warrants separate treatment. Finally, the behavioral responses in Kenya and Tanzania were profoundly different because, at times, quantity-rationing was in effect in Tanzania. Although this makes the comparison more interesting, it requires that in the first instance the two cases must be modeled differently. Since we have reported our Tanzania model elsewhere Gunning 1986, forthcoming, and , this article is confined to Kenya. The entire project is reported in Bevan, Collier, and Gunning (forthcoming) .
The theory of how economies respond to permanent external shocks has been intensively studied in recent years (Corden 1984, Neary and van Wijnbergen 1986) . Much of this analysis has been conducted in a static framework, which is appropriate to one-time changes in the external environment. 2 However, many 2. For example, Neary and van Wijnbergen (1986, chap. 1) do introduce investment in a two-period version of the standard Dutch disease model, but under the assumption that there are no market imperfections. Conversely, when they consider imperfect capital markets (p. 31) investment is assumed away.
shocks are essentially temporary in character, and for these it is necessary to extend the usual analysis into a more dynamic framework. The coffee boom in Kenya is a good example of this type of temporary shock, and in the next section we attempt to make the appropriate extension.
In a static, one-sector economy, with no government controls, long time horizons, and perfect markets for goods and factors, the theory of private response to a temporary shock is straightforward and familiar. A rational economic agent experiencing a windfall gain will save (invest) it all to enhance his permanent income; incremental consumption will be confined to what can be sustained from this enhanced permanent income.
Once these restrictions are relaxed, matters become more complicated. The existence of nontradable goods permits changes in their price relative to that of tradables, and movements in this relative price play an important part in the story. This is the central insight of the literature on Dutch disease. When it is combined with the intertemporal aspect already noted, it is necessary to distinguish further within the nontradable category between consumption and capital goods.
These relative price changes engender powerful effects of two kinds. The first involves transfers between agents, particularly between the rural and urban sectors. The second involves real effects, notably a reduction in the proportion of a windfall that is invested. These effects are likely to be amplified in the presence of government controls that prevent full market adjustment.
In Kenya, the coffee boom amounted to a terms of trade gain of KL339m (m = million; 1975 prices) in the period 1976-79, equivalent to 32 percent of 1975 gross domestic product (GDP) . While in Tanzania the price increase was largely taxed away, in Kenya the producer price of coffee rose almost as much as the world price so that coffee producers, predominantly smallholders, were the initial beneficiaries of the boom. The following section provides some theoretical groundwork to trace the effects of this shock through the economy. In section II, estimates are made of relative price changes, private investment expenditure, and real changes in assets, using standard National Accounts data. In section III, this is supplemented by a general equilibrium analysis using a simulation model. This enables us, in particular, to estimate the extent to which farmers lost their initial gains through transfers to urban groups.
I. THE THEORY OF ACCOMMODATION TO TEMPORARY SHOCKS
When an economy benefits from an exogenous change, such as a favorable movement in its terms of trade, some adjustment is necessary. The enhanced income implies increased domestic demand for both tradable and nontradable goods. This normally requires a rise in the price of nontradables relative to tradables, an expansion of nontradable production, and a contraction of tradable output, This type of effect has been extensively analyzed in a static framework under the general description of Dutch disease. While the present article addresses this issue, we also wish to focus on the time dimension, which here assumes particular importance because of the temporary nature of the coffee boom. Given that the windfall was perceived to be temporary, beneficiaries would wish to devote a large proportion of it to asset accumulation. In the normal case, to which we restrict attention, the price of nontradable capital goods will therefore be driven up further than those of nontradables in general. The allocation of these capital goods between productive sectors will in turn influence relative prices by altering the conditions of supply.
The effect of a permanent windfall is depicted in figure 1 , which portrays the production possibility set for nontradables, N, and for tradables other than coffee, T. The windfall of AB shifts the set vertically, raising it from AA' to BA'. The relative price of nontradables is higher in the new equilibrium, E', than at the initial equilibrium, E.
The effect of a temporary windfall is depicted in figure 2. Nontradables must now be disaggregated into capital, K, and consumer, C, goods, and two 
K~eY: C =consumer goods, nontradable; K = capital goods, nontradable; N = nontradables; PC= price of consumer goods, nontradable; PK = price of capital goods, nontradable; PT = price of tradables; T = tradables (other than coffee). independent relative prices, PKIPT and PC/PT, define the space for the figure. KK and CC are the prewindfall equilibrium price loci for the two nontradables, E being the initial equilibrium. A permanent windfall, in which demand for these two goods expanded proportionately, would leave PKIPC unaffected (unless supply elasticities differed), shifting the equilibrium to E'. A temporary windfall, in which the investment rate rises, raises the KK locus proportionately more than the CC locus, shifting the equilibrium to a point such as E". Hence PKIPT rises by more than PCIPTThese relative price changes are likely to have two important effects on supply and demand besides those usually expected. First, they will have significant distributional consequences, as part of the initial incremental spending accrues as rents to suppliers of nontradable goods. That is, part of the windfall to coffee producers is transferred to other agents within the economy. Second, the relative price changes will also markedly reduce the proportion of the windfall which is invested and raise the proportion consumed.3 This involves two mechanisms. The first is the direct effect, with the high relative price of capital reducing the quantity demanded. At the first round, this induces both a substitution effect and a reinforcing income effect, since the purchasing power of the windfall in the hands of the initial recipients is reduced. The second mechanism is the income transfer already noted. To the extent that the rise in the price of nontradables is fully accounted for by rents, these will be spent and there is no economywide income effect. In the aggregate, the diversion of the windfall from asset accumulation reflects only the substitution effect. To the extent that the rise in price reflects a rise in resource costs, there will be, in addition, some residual income effect.
The supply curve of nontradables is likely to be more sharply upward-sloping in the short than in the long run. This suggests that an attempt to absorb quickly the windfall resources into the domestic economy may be very costly. This raises three questions. First, what proportion of the windfall should be invested; second, how much should be utilized for domestic capita]L formation; and third, how should this investment be phased? Each question is considered, in turn, below.
The Consumption-Investment Choice
We may distinguish two cases. In the first, a household's current consumption is constrained by liquidity rather than by net worth. It then appears likely that part or all of a windfall may be consumed directly, with the residue being invested to provide an increment to permanent consumption. In the second, consumption is not constrained by liquidity, and the whole windfall will be invested, with consumption rising in line with the income from this investment. Kenyan farmers are typically credit constrained, with on-farm investment limited by the level of household savings. An income windfall would permit higher consumption and higher investment; in the textbook case of declining marginal product of capital, the optimal consumption path would then jump to a higher, flatter path.
This argument suggests that the first case is the relevant one. It does not account, however, for the nature of the investment choices facing the farmer. These frequently involve choices between relatively safe, low return strategies and relatively risky, high return ones. If relative risk aversion rises as income falls, as is commonly supposed, and if there are economies of scale in high yield strategies, then a windfall income gain may permit or induce a switch fom low to high return investments. In this case, the windfall induces investment in excess of its own value, and consumption temporarily drops.
To summarize, it appears that even in the credit constrained case, private agents may attempt to save a high proportion of the windfall. This was the case in Kenya, as established by the calculations reported below.
Investment in Domestic Capital
Under perfect international capital markets, and in the presence of imperfectly correlated risk, part of the increased asset holding would be in the form of domestic real assets, and part in the form of foreign financial assets. International capital markets are not perfect, however. A country like Kenya can lend, but not borrow, at the world interest rate. The borrowing rate for Kenyans is higher than the world rate, is country specific, and is upward sloping in the aggregate. If the domestic capital market is reasonably efficient, the domestic rate of return will be equated to the borrowing rate if the country is a net debtor, to the lending rate if it is a creditor, and otherwise lie between the two. For a capital-short economy, the domestic rate of return will lie above the lending rate, so additional assets should be held in the form of domestic real capital, once adequate working reserves of foreign exchange have been acquired.
It might be objected that the discrepancy between borrowing and lending rates is a risk premium and that the appropriate comparison is between equivalent riskless rates. But the risk premium embodied in the borrowing rate is appropriate to the risks faced or perceived by the international financial community, and these need bear little relation to the risks faced by the country's own nationals.
Phasing of Investment
It was noted earlier that an attempt to invest the windfall domestically might prove very costly if carried out too quickly. This is because the supply of nontradable goods is likely to be less elastic in the short run than in the long, as there are lags in the production process and administrative difficulties arise in absorbing and managing rapid changes. These are the familiar reasons for supposing that the marginal efficiency of investment schedule will slope down more steeply than the marginal efficiency of capital schedule.
At the same time, too slow a rate of investment will also prove costly. This is because the part of the windfall earmarked for investment but not yet invested in domestic capital must be held in the form of foreign financial assets, and these yield only the relatively low lending rate of interest. 4 It follows that there will be an optimal phasing of domestic investment. During the windfall phase, domestic investment should only increase up to the point at which its return (taking into account the capital losses incurred as the price of capital goods subsequently falls) falls to equality with the world interest rate. Beyond this point foreign financial assets should be accumulated. The holding of such assets can only be temporary, however, since once capital goods prices have reverted to their initial level, then, by assumption, the domestic return exceeds the world interest rate. Foreign financial assets are run down after the windfall in such a way as to preserve the marginal equality between returns on foreign financial and domestic real investment.
The Effect of Controls
The discussion so far has been confined to the optimizing behavior of private agents given capital market imperfections but allowing for no other complications. In Kenya private behavior is further constrained by a variety of government controls, and the behavior of the government itself is a crucial determinant of the outcome. In this article we restrict ourselves to a positive treatment of government behavior;5 the control regime is part of the description of the system, and no attempt is made to model optimum modifications of it. Of course, there is likely to be some change in controls during a windfall; in Kenya the principal change was a temporary relaxation of import controls, and this is the case considered here.
Foreign Exchange Controls. Kenyan citizens are not allowed to hold foreign financial assets, and this policy was maintained throughout the boom. Its effect was to restrict their asset choices to either domestic real or domestic financial assets. In the aggregate, however, Kenyan households and firms could only acquire extra net financial assets from the monetary authority. At best this would have involved the central bank issuing extra fiat money during the boom backed by its own extra holding of foreign financial assets. This foreign currency held on behalf of private agents would then be run down as the latter spent their temporary extra holdings of fiat money on capital goods.
Two problems are created by this control. First, there is an inflationary potential caused by the injection of extra fiat money if the banks are able to increase their advances, thus increasing the money supply by more than the increase in fiat money. Since the Kenyan banking system was subject to financial repression, as discussed below, banks were indeed able to increase advances. This could only be offset by a large increase in the legal minimum cash or liquidity ratio for the duration of the increase in fiat money. Second, the central bank must recognize that as the fiat money is spent on real assets the extra foreign exchange which augments the reserves as the counterpart of the increase in fiat money will shortly be claimed by private agents.
Import Controls. The Kenyan government has a complex set of quantitative controls on imports involving separate authorizations for import of goods and access to foreign exchange. This has the important consequence that the economy started the boom with suppressed demand for imports.
The boom increased the demand for imports. In the limiting case, had all imports been subject to quantitative restrictions, the foreign exchange windfall would have been depleted only through a reduction in the volume of exports, as capital and labor were diverted from export production to the formation of capital goods. Hence, the windfall would still gradually be transformed from foreign exchange into domestic real assets, but less efficiently, so that the increase in assets would be smaller.
5.
We intend to provide a normative treatment on another occasion.
Monetary Controls. The central bank imposed on bank lending an interest rate ceiling (generally negative in real terms) and a minimum liquidity ratio, creating financial repression. Only a small proportion of investment was financed through bank intermediaries (the other possible financial intermediaries, bond and equity markets, were practically nonexistent). The economy thus started the boom with a pent-up demand for loans.
If these banking controls were unaltered during the boom, as a result of the monetary expansion described above there would be a temporary financial liberalization. This would be beneficial in that just at the peak flow of investment in the economy, the banks would increase the proportion of savings efficiently allocated. Because of its temporary nature, however, it has some harmful effects which will be detailed below.
II. AN ANALYSIS OF NATIONAL ACCOUNTS DATA
In applying the preceding analysis to Kenyan data we encounter two problems. First, statistics are generally not aggregated so as to accord with the conceptual distinction between tradable and nontradable goods. Second, the analysis is fundamentally concerned with a hypothetical question, namely, how outcomes would have been different without the boom. For some purposes a reasonable proxy for this hypothetical case is the preboom economy (1975) projected on some trend. In addition to the difficulty of correctly identifying the trend, however, actual outcomes differed from trend not only because of the coffee boom but because of two other shocks. One was the oil shock of 1979-80, and the other was the public expenditure boom consequent upon, but conceptually distinct from, the increase in coffee earnings, from which we wish to abstract in this paper. The only way of quantifying the pure coffee earnings effect, which is the comparison of two hypothetical states, is by means of simulations generated by a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. Because CGES introduce their own weaknesses, however, we begin by investigating actual events as portrayed in the national accounts.
In table 1, the national accounts data are used to present output and relative price series for the period 1975-79. The coffee boom is identifiable as an improvement in the terms of trade. Further, there is a considerable increase in the relative price of domestically produced capital goods which accords with the preceding theoretical analysis. The quantities series indicates that increases in the volume of exports were only a minor component of the boom in export earnings. To give an indication of the magnitude of the terms of trade windfall, had the relative price of (nonoil) exports to (nonoil) imports been constant at its 1975 level through 1976-79, and had export quantities been unaffected by this, then export earnings would have been K£338.9m lower (at 1975 prices6) .
During 1976-79, the savings from the windfall income were accumulated partly as real and partly as financial assets. We estimate windfall accumulation e. Derived from the deflator on market sector GFKF, the deflator for nonoil imports, and the ratio of imported capital goods (excluding government imports) to market sector GFKF. It is assumed that the price of imported capital moved in line with the nonoil imports deflator.
Source : Statistical Abstract, 1980, 1983 tables 39, 43, 66, and 70. of real assets by market sector agents 7 at K£215.8m. We arrive at this figure by a chain of calculations shown in table 2, adopting a simple specification of counterfactual growth in the economy, namely, that in 1976-79 the contributions of the boom were the K£338.9m previously measured, plus the output consequent upon this windfall investment.
Recall that the only way that private agents could accumulate net financial assets was by an increase in holdings of fiat money. The real increase in fiat money over the end-1975 to end-1979 period was K£49.4m. We attribute K£12.3m of this to the nonboom growth in market sector real incomes (based on the 1975 ratio of fiat money to market sector income). Hence, the boom-attributable increase in holdings of net financial assets is estimated at K£37.1m.
To convert the above estimates of real and financial windfall private accumulation into rates of savings out of windfall income might seem straightforward since the direct taxes levied on the windfall export revenue of K£338.9m were negligible. There are four reasons why the gross increase in incomes (which induced the observed accumulations) might have been greater than the direct export revenue effect, however. First, if this real asset accumulation generated extra output during the period 1976-79, then income would increase by more than the extra export revenue. Second, in an underemployed, fixed-price economy, an injection would have multiplier effects on real incorne. Third, the windfall expenditure caused changes in relative prices; in particular it increased capital goods prices, which generated rents on existing production. These rents, which did not use resources, generated second round income in the same way as if the 7. Kenyan data permit a clearer distinction to be drawn between market and nonmarket than between public and private sectors because of the poor quality of data on "parastatals." For most purposes these organizations can be regarded as private agents with privileged access to public finance. expenditure had purchased previously idle resources. Thus rents arising from price changes generate quasi-multiplier increases in income and expenditure. This effect should not be confused with the Keynesian multiplier, however, for it depends upon capacity constraints rather than idle resources. Fourth, if the government collects extra revenue as a result of the boom and permits its expenditure upon transfers to increase, then incomes increase in a manner analogous to the effect of extra rent. Of these nondirect sources of private accumulation, the first two cannot be quantified directly from national accounts data but can be estimated using information from our CGE simulation. In the model there is classical unemployment in the urban formal sector. While real wages are fixed in terms of consumer prices in this sector, a windfall reduces products wages and hence increases employment. Incorporating this effect, the model finds a real rate of return on windfall investments of 16 percent a year. Combining this return with our estimate of the propensity to invest in real assets (0.49; see below) and an assumed two-year gestation period, by 1979 output had increased by K£26.6m.
To characterize the effect of transfers through rents and government payments, let W denote the terms of trade windfall. In Kenya, virtually no direct taxes were levied on this windfall so that in the first round it all accrued to the market sector. In the second round, rents accrued on windfall expenditure and government revenue increased from indirect taxes on expenditure, permitting an increase in expenditure on transfers. Thus income, Y, evolves as:
( 1) t,= indirect tax rate on consumer goods k = the propensity to invest c = the propensity to consume z = the propensity of the government to make transfers rk = rental component of investment expenditure at factor cost rc = rental component of consumption expenditure at factor cost In subsequent rounds, government revenue is supplemeinted by direct taxes on rental incomes: 
Although from the viewpoint of society, the windfall is only equal to W, windfall incomes accruing to the market sector are W 1 . The observed expenditure on capital goods, K£215.8m, can therefore be characterized as kW 1 , so that k, the propensity to invest out of windfall income, can be determined (as 215.8/W 1 ) once W' is estimated.
Although equation 4 formalizes the concept of windfall income, it cannot be used as a basis for estimation since some of the propensities are unknown. We therefore estimate directly the two components of W 1 -W, rents and government transfers.
Recall from table 1 that during 1976-79, by far the largest relative price change was the increase in the price of domestic capital goods. We estimate the rents, net of tax, generated by this, [rkW 1 (1 -d)], at Kf66.8m, our derivation being set out in table 3. In principle, this procedure could be applied to changes in rents on other goods. Since other relative price changes are very small (and the components in the calculation are offsetting), however, these changes in rents are neglected. We estimate the increase in government transfers at K£6.8m, our derivation being set out in table 4.
Adding these income components to the direct windfall and the output from windfall investment yields an estimate of W 1 of K£439. 1m. The propensities to invest in real and financial assets out of windfall income therefore were around 49.1 percent and 8.4 percent respectively, implying an overall savings rate out of the windfall of near 60 percent. This compares with a preboom savings rate of around 20 percent.
In section I we suggest that the accumulation of fiat money as a financial asset would (unless sterilized) generate a temporary financial liberalization, permitting e. The increase in the rate of duty thus accounts for part of the relative price change. f. Extra production of capital goods (14.9) over prior levels of capital goods production (467.7). g. Increase in price (73.7) over total quantity purchased at 1975 prices (482.6). h. Taking a linear approximation to the supply curve, the cost of the 14.9 increase in quantity was 16.0, so that 1.1 was absorbed in increased unit costs.
i. Sales taxes on domestic capital goods were negligible. s02 THE WORLD BANK ECONOMIC REVIEW, VOL. 1, NO. 3 increases in financial intermediation and consumer credit. This can be investigated through central bank data on advances which are classified partly by sector and partly by use. This classification enables us to construct reasonable proxies for advances used to finance capital formation and advances used for consumer credit.4 According to our proxy for advances for capital formation, in 1975 only 11 percent of market sector capital formation was financed through advances, whereas in 1976-79, despite the large increase in capital formation, 50 percent of the increase in gross fixed capital formation (GFKF) was so financed.5 This 40 percent increase in financial intermediation suggests that prior to the boom there was considerable financial repression.
Our proxy for advances for consumer imports shows a markedly different time path from advances for capital formation. Over the entire boom and postboom period , real advances for consumer imports rose by only Kfl.6m against K£77.0m for capital formation. By contrast, at the peak of the boom (end-1978), consumer imports advances had increased by Kf47.4m against K£66.2m for GFKF. This trajectory of consumption indebtedness, with agents anticipating income during the temporary trade and financial liberalization phase and repaying it afterward, accords with our theoretical analysis.
While such a large, albeit temporary, financial liberalization might have improved the allocation of investment resources, this is by no means certain, for banks which have operated for a long period under conditions of financial repression have acquired expertise in only a restricted class of lending. As suggested in table 1, GFKF was strongly skewed toward import-substituting manufacturing. The analysis of section III, to which we now turn, suggests that by 1983 this sectoral skew in investment had caused such a substantial fall in the relative price of import-substitutes that the allocation was unlikely to have been either privately or socially efficient.
III. GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
In this section we use a general equilibrium model to analyze the effects of the boom.6 The use of a model has two advantages. First, it allows us to widen the scope of the analysis. In addition to changes induced by the boom in asset formation, relative prices and resource allocation, we consider the question of who benefited from the boom. We have already noted that the boom must have 4. Our proxy for capital formation advances is advances to manufacturing, construction, transport, and large-scale agriculture. That for consumer credit is import and domestic trade, and advances to households for other than housing.
5. In the sectors listed above, GFKF was KL569.2m, an increase of K£63.4m over the 1975 rate (all at 1975 prices). The proportion of incremental real advances to GFKF in 1975 was 10.9 percent. The actual increase in advances was K£87.6m. This can be decomposed into Kf505.8m of GFKF supported by K£55.1m of advances (had 1975 behavior persisted) and K£63.4m of extra GFKF supported by K£32.Sm of extra advances, an incremental advances ratio of 51.3 percent.
6. The model is described in Bevan, Collier, and Gunning (forthcoming), chap. S. An earlier version was published in Gunning (1983) . In the appendix we give an outline of the present version.
caused large changes in relative prices. By comparing the simulation experiments, we can trace the distributional effects of these price changes. In particular we consider changes in the incomes of smallholders and urban households. Second, the model allows us to eliminate the shocks (other than the coffee boom) which affected the Kenyan economy in the 1975-83 period. It thereby enables us to extend the analysis to the postboom period, 1980-83. Since by 1983 most of the boom's effects had occurred, we take this year as the endpoint of our simulation experiments. In particular, the long-run consequences of the extra investment for product supplies and hence prices had largely occurred. The shocks in the postboom period which we here eliminate include large increases in public expenditure and foreign borrowing and the second oil price increase of 1980-8 1. We analyze those shocks elsewhere , chap. 5); here we consider only the rise of coffee and tea prices. We will compare two simulation experiments: a "boom run" in which export prices and producer prices for both coffee and tea have their actual values, and a "counterf actual run" in which these prices grow at the same rate as the price of nonoil imports in the period 1976-80. All other assumptions are the same in the two runs so that the differences between them can indeed be attributed to the rise of coffee and tea prices."' Details of the model are given in the appendix, together with a sensitivity test of key assumptions.
Of particular interest is the boom's effect on the incomes of smallholders. They constitute the largest group of the poor in Kenya and as significant producers of coffee and tea (accounting, in 1975 , for 48 percent and 28 percent of total production respectively) they might be expected to have benefited enormously from the increase in world prices which was passed on to farmers. The model finds that smallholder incomes increased by 20.8 percent as a result of the boom: 16.7 percent as a result of the price rise itself and the remainder as a result of indirect effects (see table 5 ). These indirect effects include a substantial rise in coffee and tea production (more labor is allocated to these crops, partly at the expense of other crops, partly at the expense of leisure); increases in remittances received by smallholders from urban households; and finally, a rise in income from nonfarm enterprises and from (both agricultural and nonagricultural) wage employment. The most important thing to note about table 5, however, is not the composition of the 21 percent income increase, but the fact that it is, to a considerable extent (more than 40 percent) offset by adverse relative price changes. The consumer prices which are relevant to smallholders rise so much that their real income gain is reduced to 11.2 percent.
Before we attempt to explain this result it should be stressed how surprising it is, given what we know about the composition of smallholders' consumption 11. The most important of these assumptions are: the share of public consumption in GDP remains constant in real terms (22.1 percent); foreign savings grow at 7 percent a year in constant world prices; real wages in the formal sector remain constant; and the price of oil grows at the rate of the price of nonoil imports after 1979. Note that actual coffee and tea prices are used for 1981-83 in both runs: prices differ only in the 1976-80 period. Note: This simulation uses actual values of export and producer prices for coffee and tea. In the counterfactual simulation, these prices grow at the rate of increase of the nonoil imports, 1976-80. expenditure. They have a high marginal propensity to consume food (0.7), and food commodities are modeled as tradables which are not subject to any quantitative restrictions. In the extreme case-if coffee and tea were only grown by smallholders, if they had not adjusted their production, and if they had spent all of the additional income on food-very little would have changed outside the smallholder sector. Since domestic food prices are tied to world prices and the market is cleared through changes in imports, food consumption and imports would both have increased by the amount of the terms of trade gain and the balance of trade would have been preserved without any other change in real variables. This mental experiment is not completely unrealistic: given the absence of quantitative restrictions on food imports, smallholders' high marginal propensity to consume food does tend to isolate the rest of the economy from the effects of changes in smallholder incomes. But, of course, part of the extra income is saved, part of it is used to increase nonfood consumption, all of the extra spending requires trade and transportation activities, coffee and tea are also produced on large farms, and, finally, input-output linkages and the government's spending of its extra tariff and tax revenue spread the effects to other sectors. This increased demand for urban commodities requires, in the case of nontradables, increases in domestic production. But in the short run (with a given capital stock) supply elasticities are low: the output increases are accompanied by substantially higher prices (as predicted in section I). At the peak of the boom, gross output prices for nontradables are 50 percent higher than in the counterfactual run, 1 2 with particularly large price increases in trade and construction.
To what extent relative prices also increase for importables depends critically on trade policy. The model distinguishes between food and nonfood importables; only nonfood imports are subject to quantitative restrictions. Hence food prices are unaffected by the boom: extra demand is reflected in an increase in food imports rather than in price rises. Nonfood imports are subject to import controls, and if controls are maintained, the relative price of nonfood importables would rise as a result of the boom, just as for nontradables. Kenya did relax import controls during the boom, however. In the model, trade liberalization is made endogenous. Up to a point, controls are in force and the domestic price adjusts to clear the market. Demand for imports in excess of the controlled level is then choked off by increases in price. We assume, however, that if a price ceiling is reached then controls are relaxed, so that imports clear the market at the ceiling price. This defines a maximum level of protection for domestic producers.
This specification has powerful effects on the results. In 1978, for example, import controls are effective in the counterfactual run, but in the boom run, the price ceilingl3 is reached and extra imports account for 43 percent of total imports in that year. Clearly, if trade liberalization were less substantial the domestic prices of nonfood manufactured consumer goods would be higher and the income gains of smallholders would be further eroded.
In table 5 we aggregated over all smallholder households, which masks the differences between coffee and tea growers and other smallholders. It is often argued that the boom benefited only the former group and therefore led to a large increase in rural inequality. Smallholders who did not grow coffee or tea were affected in several ways by the boom. First, total labor use on smallholdings increased by over 20 percent, and wages in the smallholder sector rose by 29 percent. Since those smallholders who did not benefit directly from the boom were net suppliers of hired labor, they experienced a terms of trade gain, realizing a substantial increase in their income from employment. Second, the spending of coffee and tea growers raises the income from nonfarm enterprises accruing to 12. This is a relative price increase since the price of the nonoil imports which we used as numeraire in section II is the same in the two runs.
13. The maximum price is defined in terms of the tariff equivalent of the controls: the maximum equivalent tariff rate is set equal to the rate in 1976 in the counterfactual run. Hence the government is modeled as being unwilling to let the boom lead to an increase in the protection of domestic producers. If one were to relax this assumption, nonfood importables would behave more like nontradables and the model would then generate even higher estimates of the distributional effects of the boom. Since world prices and foreign savings (the value of the resource deficit) are exogenous in the model, export volumes determine the value of total imports. Hence the trade policy assumption does not affect the total import volume but only its distribution over sectors. Trade liberalization implies an increase of imports of manufactured consumer goods at the expense of other imports.
other smallholders. Third, their income from remittances increases with boominduced growth in urban income. Finally, there is a negative effect: all smallholders are affected by the rise in rural consumer prices which is due to the boom.
Since the model is regionally disaggregated, we are able to investigate changes in the regional distribution of income. We find that income gains are not restricted to Central and Eastern provinces, where smallholder coffee growing is concentrated. Smallholders in Coast and Nyanza provinces also benefit. Only in the Rift Valley and Western Province is the change in income negligible or slightly negative. In these provinces, the direct employment and nonfarm enterprise income effects are very weak, and since households do not have strong urban ties (unlike those in Central Province) the third effect operating via urban-rural remittances is also weak. The rise in consumer prices therefore dominates the other three effects.
The overall effect of the boom is thus to slightly increase rural inequality: the income share of the bottom 40 percent of smallholders falls from 31 to 29 percent. Absolute poverty decreases: the number of smallholder households below the poverty line used in the model falls by 11 percent.
In table 5 we showed the model's results for only one year, 1977. After this peak year, the differences between the two runs (both for income components and for rural wages and consumer prices) become progressively smaller, until, at the very end of the simulation period (1983), the difference in real income is only 3.1 percent.
During the boom, coffee growers invested quite heavily in coffee and tea trees, livestock, housing, water supply, education, and financial assets. Using survey data, we analyze the details of those decisions (and their consequences for permanent income) elsewhere ). Here we treat smallholders as if they invested only in coffee and in financial assets, our concern being the extent to which savings are eroded by price changes. In the previous section we calculated the marginal savings rate of private agents out of the extra income generated by the boom as 0.575. Adopting this savings rate, we calculate that smallholders save a total of K£128.3m during the boom. Part of this (19 percent) is withdrawn in the first four years after the boom, but smallholders leave the bulk of their savings (K£103.9m) deposited with the banking system after 1983.
Much of this savings consists of claims on crop authorities and of demand deposits so that the rate of return on these assets is close to zero. Transaction costs (which, in the case of time deposits, are very high for smallholders) and long delays in payments for crops effectively preclude investrment in financial assets with a positive return. Hence, the financial assets acquired during the boom do not add to smallholders' permanent income. 1 4 Nevertheless, their income in 1983 14. Note that, in any case, the rate of return on financial assets would have to be very high (8.7 percent) by Kenyan standards to give even a modest 1 percent increase in permanent income [0.01(901.1) / 103.9 = 0.087]. is 3 percent higher in the simulated boom run than in the counterfactual case (table 6 ). Even if smaliholders had invested 100 percent of their extra income in the boom period in real or financial assets yielding 12 percent a year, they would not have realized a permanent income increase of 3 percent.
Hence the simulation experiments demonstrate that the indirect effects of a commodity boom can be strong. There are two such effects. First, smallholders receive benefit in the form of remittances and higher incomes from nonagricultural activities from boom-induced urban growth (which is, it should be noted, partly financed out of smallholders' savings). This accounts for about half of the 3 percent income gains. The other half is due to relative price changes, which now favor smallholders: the adverse, short-run effect which we discussed earlier is reversed in the long run. This is because in the postboom period domestic demand drops but the supply curves of urban goods have shifted to the right because of investment. Table 6 indicates the importance of the resulting difference in relative prices between the two runs: it accounts for a 1.6 percent increase in the real income of smallholders, more than half of their total income gain in the final year.
The real income gain for urban households is about 15 percent in the short run and 8 percent in the long run (table 7) . Since the incomes of urban households are much higher than those of smallholders these figures reflect a massive redistribution of income from rural to urban groups. Measured in current prices, total transient household income (the difference between runs in incomes of households in the period 1976-79) amounts to K£1019.3m and of this total K£804.4m (or 79 percent) accrues to urban households. Hence the bulk of the boom income ends up in urban hands.
There are two reasons for this transfer to urban households, one static and one dynamic. In a static model, if imports are controlled, the boom would have resulted in increases in the relative prices of importables and nontradables (the Dutch disease effects). Smallholders do not produce these commodities and hence the benefits of these price changes accrue (as higher wage and profit income) entirely to other groups. Second, the boom leads to a very large increase in the level of investment: gross fixed capital formation (in constant prices) in the boom period is 48 percent higher than in the counterfactual case. In Kenya, the allocation of investment was already heavily biased toward the urban sectors and, as we saw in the previous section, this bias increased during the boom. Hence the benefits of the rise in coffee and tea prices accrue largely to urban areas, partly because of the relative price changes discussed before and partly because of the way in which investment was allocated. Table 7 shows that in 1977 urban groups already benefited more from the boom than smallholders. Household incomes in that year are 36 percent higher than in the counterfactual case (as opposed to the 21 percent income gain for rural households-table 6). Urban consumer prices rise by 18.3 percent so that price changes affect about half of the income gains, leaving a real income gain of 14.9 percent.
Since three-quarters of the urban labor force is wage ermployed, the income gain is largely explained by the increase (19 percent in 1977) in formal sector wage employment.15 As discussed previously, the spending of the proceeds of the boom (whether on consumption or investment) requires increased output from the urban sectors. 16 Since the capital stock is given in the short run, this requires increased employment: the unemployed and self-employed are drawn into formal sector wage employment. As a result of the reduction in the number of people 15. Note that in the two runs, the real wages are assumed to be the same, so that the increase in wage income is entirely a quantity change.
16. An increase in output may seem inconsistent with profit maximization, since the capital stock is given in the short run and real wages are constant. The paradox is easily resolved. The real wage is defined in terms of urban consumer prices, which (since food prices are unaffected by the boom) rise much less than the output prices of the urban sectors. Hence the product wage falls and this induces profit maximizing firms to increase employment and production. competing with each other in the informal sector, incomes there rise considerably, by 20 percent in real terms. The investment boom leaves the urban economy with a larger capital stock at the end of the simulation period. In addition, while in the short run product wages fall so that labor is substituted for capital, in the long run differences between prices in the runs diminish substantially so that the capital intensity of the urban sectors falls back to what it would have been in the absence of the boom. The net result is a permanent increase in wage employment in the formal sector.
Finally, we consider the boom's effects on national accounts variables (table 8). Note that the boom increases GDP at factor cost by 4.4 percent in the short run and by almost 7 percent in the long run. 17 Largely because of the way investment is allocated, output growth is increasingly concentrated in the industrial sector. The second part of the table illustrates the investment boom to which we have traced many of the income effects of the terms of trade gain. At its peak in 1977, investment is 78 percent higher than in the counterfactual case. At the end of the period, investment is still 13 percent higher, partly as a result of multiplier effects, partly because the boom redistributes income to urban groups who save a much larger fraction (out of nonboom income) than rural groups.
There is some reason to believe that in view of the controls on asset acquisition and consumer imports, Kenyans saved too large a fraction of the boom income. While private and public consumption is 2.8 percent higher than in the counterfactual case in the boom period, GDP (at market prices) is 6.6 percent higher in 1983. We would expect the optimal short-run increase in consumption to be at least as large as the permanent income increase. As we noted in section 1, in the Kenyan case there were bottlenecks in implementation of new investments, and the attempt of many agents to quickly acquire real assets changed relative prices and eroded the real value of savings. Given these 17. Use of resources (C + G + I) increases by much more: since GDP is measured in constant relative prices it does not capture the terms of trade gain.
circumstances, there are good reasons to have expected consumption out of boom income to have been larger.
V. CONCLUSION
On theoretical grounds we would expect the use made by private agents of a temporary windfall to be strongly influenced by the presence of government controls on assets and international trade. Our investigation of the Kenyan coffee boom has lent support to the theoretical analysis and has indicated that such considerations may be quantitatively important. Kenyans indeed appear to have attempted to save a high proportion of their windfall incomes (around 60 percent), but their asset choices were so restricted that this drove up the relative price of nontradable capital goods. Similarly, as their attempts to increase consumption were constrained by import controls, there were short-run redistributions in favor of domestic producers of import-substiitutes. In the longer run, the skewed sectoral allocation of windfall investment produced further powerful redistributions.
Our analysis thus suggests an unorthodox interpretation of the effects of a commodity boom in a controlled economy such as Kenya. Conventional wisdom would imply that most of the benefits would accrue to coffee and tea growers since the Kenyan government chose to pass the rise in world prices on to farmers. Yet our model indicates that the effects of the boom depend critically not just on producer pricing, but also on trade policy and investment allocation. The distortions created by these policies cause a very large part of the total gain to end up in urban rather than in rural hands.
APPENDIX: THE COMPUTABLE GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM (CGE) MODEL
The model is a fairly disaggregated general equilibrium model. There are thirty-six commodities (goods and nonfactor services), which fall into four categories: exportables (largely agricultural commodities, in particular coffee and tea), which are traded at given world prices; food commodities, which are subject to tariffs but not to quantitative restrictions; nonfood importables, which are subject to quantitative import controls; and nontradables (services). For each of these commodities, the market must clear, either through changes in quantities (for example, excess demand for food at given domestic prices being met through imports) or through changes in relative prices (for example, the price of nonfood manufactured products rising until domestic supply plus the controlled level of imports is equal to domestic demand).
There are forty-eight groups of peasants in the model.. They are distinguished by the size and location of their holding, location being an indicator of the crops which can be grown, the possibilities for nonagricultural activities, and land quality. Peasants earn their incomes from crops, from livestock, from wage employment (partly on other small holdings or on large farms, partly outside agriculture), and from nonfarm enterprises (for example, trading). The producer prices which they receive for their crops and livestock products are set by the government. Their consumption consists partly of self-produced items (in particular food) and partly of goods which are imported or produced domestically by urban firms. The combination of the endogeneity of the consumer prices paid by peasants and the exogeneity of the producer prices they receive is the main reason why changes in relative prices strongly affect the real income of peasants.
There are eight groups of urban households, distinguished by their endowments (for example, educational qualifications) which determine their access to formal sector wage employment and high-income self-employment. Real wages in the formal sector are given at a level at which there is excess supply of labor. As a result, firms face a horizontal labor supply schedule since urban workers can be drawn into formal sector employment, out of unemployment or low-income self-employment in the informal sector. Nevertheless, since capital is fully employed, output can only expand in response to changes in the product wage, which unlike the real wage is flexible. The effect of imposing a horizontal labor supply schedule is to flatten commodity supply schedules. Since the general equilibrium transfers, which are at the heart of our analysis, are diminished by this flattening, the model specification makes it something of a "devil's advocate."
The government receives its revenue from direct and indirect taxes and tariffs. It uses this revenue partly for public consumption (which implies a demand for goods and labor, but which does not add directly to anyone's utility) and partly for investment. Utility maximization determines the composition of households' consumption, but private saving is not determined by intertemporal optimization. Each household saves a fixed proportion out of its (nontransient) income. These savings rates differ between household groups, being very low for peasants and much higher for urban households. Rural-urban transfers therefore affect the rate of investment. All households save a large part of the income they consider transient (the increase in household income due to the boom being so classified). Here we use the savings rate of 0.575, derived in section I.
The capital inflow from abroad (that is, the value of the resource deficit, or the concept of foreign savings used in the national accounts) is given in terms of world prices. Hence an increase in the value of exports, such as occurred during the coffee boom, is automatically matched by an equal increase in the value of total imports. Changes in the external environment are fully and instantaneously passed on to the domestic economy.
In the model, savings determines investment rather than vice versa: the given amount of foreign savings is added to the endogenously determined amount of private and public savings and this gives the total value of investment. The allocation of investment between sectors is given exogenously. As a result, rates of return are not equalized and, without modeling the microeconomic distortions in the investment process in detail, the model incorporates the bias in investment in Kenya against agriculture and in favor of manufacturing.
In the context of the present article, three characteristics of the model should be emphasized. First, for most urban sectors constant elasticity of substitution (CES) production functions are used. In the case of manufacturing, the substitution elasticity was estimated. This gave a value close to 0.5 and this value was imposed for the other sectors. Our results obviously depend on these values, but the effect of changes in substitution elasticities is modest. For example, if we raise the imposed substitution elasticities to 0.9, the boom's contribution to long-run (1983) real income growth for smallholders is 90 percent of the case where substitution elasticities are equal to 0.5; for urban real incomes it is 70 percent; for investment 90 percent; and for industrial value-added 80 percent. Hence the model's long-run results are not very sensitive at all to the values assumed for the elasticities. In the short run, there are more substantial differences. Recall that in 1977 about 40 percent of the boom-induced increase in nominal smallholder incomes was offset by relative price changes. If substitution elasticities (a-) rise to 0.7, then 23 percent of the increase is offset, and for (T = 0.9 only 16 percent of the income gain is lost through price changes. This comparison is an extreme case, however. This is because (under our trade liberalization assumption), in 1977 prices of manufactures do not differ between the two runs. Since agricultural prices are tied to world prices this implies that smallholders can lose only through increases in prices of services. This gives the substitution elasticities in those sectors atypical importance. In the very year when the boom peaks, so that prices of services are being pushed up, prices of manufactured goods are unaffected because import controls are relaxed. For this reason, we repeat the calculation for 1978 (a year in which prices of manufactured goods do differ between runs). For a-= 0.5 we find that 27 percent of the income gain is offset by price increases; for or = 0.7 this is 20 percent; and for cr = 0.9 this is 14 percent. Hence our results do not appear to be overly sensitive to changes in cr values.
Second, nonfood manufacturing is modeled as subject to import controls, but when a maximum price level is reached the regime changes endogenously. Import controls are then relaxed and changes in demand are no longer reflected in price changes, but instead in changes in quantities (imports). This is designed to capture the fact that trade control, while politically determined, changes endogenously.
Finally, in the urban labor market, there is excess supply at a given real wage rate. If instead, labor supply curves are upward sloping., then to that extent the model underestimates the magnitude of boom-induced relative price changes.
